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9.1Introduction
The aggregate numbers and values of mergers and acquisitions in
the U.S. economy of the 1980s have attracted a considerable amount
of professional, political, and popular attention. Periodic announce-
ments of large mergers or hostile tender offers continue to command
media space and time. Something appears to be afoot in the American
economy.
Surprisingly (at least to us), the widespread interest in takeovers has
spawned relatively little effort to place the current wave in a proper
historical context or to perform time-series analysis of the available
merger and acquisition data.' Moreover, there has been virtually no
effort to discuss the limitations of the available mergers and acquisitions
data.
In this paper we attempt to help fill these gaps in our understanding
of the topic. We first discuss the available time-series data on mergers
and acquisitions and their suitability and limitations for time-series
analysis; we also offer a historical perspective on the current merger
wave. In section 9.3 we review the handful of previous time-series
analyses of mergers and acquisitions. Section 9.4 develops a series of
hypotheses on mergers that can be tested econometrically. In section
9.5wediscuss the specific methodology of our econometric tests,
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describeour data sources, and provide the results of the tests. We Fo
conclude in section 9.6. trans
merg
9.2Data Series, Their Limitations, and Some Historical Patterns to gu
And
enou 9.2.1Overview
acqu Ideally, a time series on mergers and acquisitions should be corn- vice
prehensive and consistent and should contain data that cover a long of th
period of time. Unfortunately, none of the available series meets these aggr
criteria, and compromises must be made. time
One limitation to all of the available series is especially serious and
warrants preliminary discussion: No data series includes every merger 9.2.4
and acquisition in the U.S. economy; all series have a lower limit on
the nominal dollar size of the transactions reported. For example, one aftei
data series discussed below includes only those mergers in which the
acquired firm had assets of $10 million or more. Thus, the purchase of
Mabel'sCoffee Shop by Sam's Garage—or even the "leveraged buy- TI
out" of Mabel's Coffee Shop by Mabel's manager and cashier, Doris— acqi
will not be reported in any data series. SiOfl
This kind of limitation has four consequences. First and most ob- rep
viously, the smaller transactions are neglected. If these smaller trans- the
actions are highly correlated with the larger, reported ones, or if the
former are relatively unimportant in the aggregate, then little has been
lost. But if otherwise, the series may provide a misleading picture of mai
merger activity over time. (And, since the transactions below the lower 194
limit are not recorded, there is no way to tell.) qui
Second, if the period covered by the time series was one of significant $10
inflation, the fixed lower limit on dollar size will artificially inflate the acc
number of recorded transactions over time. In essence, the pattern of for
rising prices over the time period covered by the series will mean that qui
some transactions of a given real size will fall below the fixed cutoff point SO
in the early years and hence not be recorded, whereas in later years in- be
flation will drive the nominal value of identical transactions above the A
cutoffpoint and thus cause them to be recorded. The longer the time mu
period covered by a series and the greater the inflation, the more sub- fro
stantial is this problem of a spurious increase in the number of recorded thr
transactions. In addition, this problem is not easily corrected with a sim-
pie adjustment for inflation (for example, through the use of a price in- Bu
dex or deflator), since one needs to know the shape of the distribution thi
of the real size of merger transactions (and, as a further complication,
the shape of that distribution may change over time).2 thi
Third, a time series of the aggregate value of the reported transac- rel
tions will be biased upward because of both a pure inflation effect3 and CO
the cutoff point problem just discussed. $1267ATime-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
•We Fourth, many merger announcements (especially those for smaller
transactions involving privately held companies) do not provide specific
merger terms or values. Consequently, the reporting services may have
to guess whether a transaction should be included in their data series.
S And even if the reporting service is confident that a transaction is large
enough to warrant inclusion in its series on the number of mergers and
acquisitions, the absence of value information usually causes the ser-
corn- vice to exclude the transaction from its series on the aggregate value
long of those mergers and acquisitions. Accordingly, the time series on the
hese aggregate value of the transactions are even less complete than the
time series on the number of transactions.
and
9.2.2The Available Data Series
it on Our discussion will first focus on the data available for the period
one after World War II and then discuss the data for the prewar period.
Post—World War 11 Data
buy- There are three basic sources of time-series data on mergers and
ris— acquisitions for the postwar period: the U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), the periodical Mergers & Acquisitions, and the annual
ob- reports of W.T. Grimm & Co. We will discuss each of these sources,
ans- the nature of the data, and their strengths and drawbacks, in turn.
the
FTC Data. The FTC collected and published data on mergers in the
'e of manufacturing and mining sectors of the U.S. economy for the years
wer 1948— One basic data set covered all mergers in which the ac-
quired firm was in the manufacturing or mining sectors and had at least
cant $10 million in assets (book value) and for which information on the
the acquisition was publicly available.5 The FTC published annual figures
n of for both the number of mergers and the book value of the assets ac-
that quired. It also provided the relevant information on each transaction,
oint so that quarterly series on numbers of mergers and their value could
s in- be constructed.
the A second FTC series, which also covered the manufacturing and
time mining sectors, gave annual numbers of merger transactions extending
sub- from 1940 through 1979 and quarterly numbers extending from 1940
rded through 1954.6 This second series appears to have been more inclusive
sirn- than the first, since a far larger number of transactions were registered.
in- But, unfortunately, the FTC did not indicate the inclusion criteria for
LtiOfl this series.
ion, The FTC data have a number of shortcomings. First, they cover only
the manufacturing and mining sectors, which declined substantially in
sac- relative importance in the economy over the 1948—79 period and now
and constitute only a quarter of U.S. gross national product. Second, the
$10 million lower limit obviously created an upward bias, since theDevraL. Golbe and Lawrence .1. White 269
generalprice level (as measured by the GNP deflator) tripled over the Nelsoi
32 years covered by the series. Third, the series excluded acquisitions action
by an individual or groups of individuals and hence would appear to For
exclude most leveraged buyouts of divisions or of whole companies. Ofl the
And finally, the FTC ceased collecting and publishing these data series
1981 (with 1979 as the last year for which data were made available), inclus
so the series do not cover the merger wave of the 1980s. in 194
Mergers & Acquisitions Data. Quarterly issues of the periodical Merg-
A S ers & Acquisitions (M&A) list the number of mergers and acquisitions
consummated in recent quarters for the entire U.S. economy. Before Alt
the fourth quarter of 1980 the lower limit for inclusion in the series quisit
was a purchase price of at least $700,000; in that quarter the lower enou
limit was raised to $1,000,000. A quarterly series on domestic corn- do p
panies being purchased (by either domestic or foreign companies) cx- FTC
tends from the first quarter of 1967 to the present. Another series that porta
also includes domestic companies' purchases of foreign companies ex- the ii
tends from the fourth quarter of 1972 to the present. Both series include at
leveraged buyouts. Cussi
The M&A series have a number of drawbacks. First, they do not
extend as far back in time as the FTC series. Second, the lower limit
9 2 3 for inclusion changed abruptly in the middle of the series and, even
so, did not properly adjust for the tripling of prices that occurred over H
the period covered. Third, efforts at integrating or splicing the M&A pres
series with the FTC series (to create a longer overall series that would belo
be up-to-date) pose problems of compatibility, since the series cover soui
different universes and have different criteria for inclusion. T
Figi
The Grimm Data. W.T. Grimm & Co. publishes data on the number of and
merger and acquisition announcements in the entire U.S. economy. mei
The company's published annual series extends from 1963 through the trac
present; its quarterly series extends from the first quarter of 1974 through a m
the present. The lower limit for inclusion is a transaction involving at rise
least a $500,000 purchase price. I"
The Grimm data have the same problems as the M&A data: a limited I
historical reach; a fixed lower limit for inclusion; and difficulties of as
integration with the FTC data. In addition, the Grimm data pertain to
announcements rather than consummations. Thi
rca
Pre—Worid War II Data FT
The major source of merger data for the years 1895— 1920 is the study COl
conductedby Ralph Nelson (1959). Nelson's data appear to cover only .
themanufacturing and mining sectors. The cutoff limits are not explicit; IS
rather, Nelson relied on financial reporting during the period covered, the269 ATime-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
• the Nelson provided annual and quarterly series7 for the number of trans-
ions actions and the book value of the acquired firms.8
r to For the years 1919—39 Willard Thorpe compiled a quarterly series
iies. on the number of mergers in the manufacturing and mining sectors, a
a in series that was reproduced by Nelson (1959,166—67).The criteria for
inclusion in the series are unclear. The Thorpe series was continued
in 1940 by the broad FTC series discussed above, and the two series
appear to be consistent and compatible.
erg- ASumming Up
ons
fore Although data series are available that include the merger and ac-
ries quisition experience of the 1980s, these series do not extend back far
wer enough to provide an adequate historical perspective. The FTC data
do provide historical reach, but they end in 1979. Furthermore, the
cx- FTC data exclude the services sectors, which are an increasingly im-
hat portant part of the U.S. economy. Finally, the inconsistencies between
ex- the more recent data series and the FTC data complicate any efforts
ude at statistical inference. These problems will necessarily color the dis-
cussion and analysis below.
.not
mit
yen 9.2.3Some Historical Patterns
ver Having described the data series (and their drawbacks), we now
&A presenta summary of the historical patterns they suggest. The graphs
uld below provide some indication of the consistency of the various data
ver sources as well as a historical perspective on mergers and acquisitions.
The FTC data are a basic source for research on merger activity.
Figure 9.1 shows the annual FTC data for the number of large mining
• of and manufacturing mergers and for "all" mining and manufacturing
ny. mergers, that is, the broader series. As can be seen, the two series
the track each other reasonably well. Both show a rise in the mid-1950s,
igh a more gradual rise in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then a sharp
at rise in the late 1960s (the "go-go years"9), followed by a steep decline
in the early 1970s and another increase in the late l970s.
ed It is sometimes suggested that the values of the transactions matter
of as much as, if not more than, the number of transactions. In fact, as
to figure 9.2 suggests, both sets of FTC data indicate similar patterns.
This figure shows annual data for both the number of mergers and the
real value (in 1982 dollars'°) of the assets acquired, as measured by the
FTC "large firm" series. Movements in the two series are fairly closely
dy correlated, and both series clearly show the peak of the "go-go years."
fly As noted above, a major drawback of the FTC series for our purposes
it; is their failure to include data on the current merger wave. To place
d. the recent experience in perspective, we need to splice more recent
LAnnual number of mergers and acquisitions and real value
of assets acquired (in millions of 1982 dollars): ETC "Large
Firm" series for manufacturing and mining
datatogetherwith an appropriate FTC series. Figure 9.3 shows the
annual number of mergers measured by the "broad" FTC series and
bythe annual M&A series covering purchases of domestic companies.
These two series appear to track each other reasonably well, with both
showing the peak in the late 1960s. The M&A data clearly depict the
boom of the 1980s.
Similarly, figure 9.4 presents quarterly data for the number of mergers
measured by the FTC "large firm" series and by the M&A "domestic"
series. These series, too, appear to track each other well.
"Large Firm Series
200
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Fig. 9.1 Annual number of mergers and acquisitions: FTC "Large


















1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975Fig. 9.4 Quarterly number of mergers and acquisitions: FTC"Large
Firm" series and M&A "Domestic" series
Figure 9.5 allows us to compare the quarterly data in the current
sources. It presents the quarterly Grimm data on the number of merg-
ers, along with the "domestic" quarterly series from M&A and the
more comprehensive quarterly series from M&A. The two M&A series
track each other quite well, but the Grimm data for the 1970s diverge
markedly from those in the other two series. The reasons for this
divergence are unclear. As was explained above, the Grimm data have
a lower cutoff point and pertain to announcements rather than com-
pletions. But it seems unlikely that these differences could account for
the divergence.
211A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
Number of Mergers
Fig. 9.3 Annual number of mergers and acquisitions: FTC"Broad"














































Fig. 9.6 Annualnumber of mergers and acquisitions: Nelson series, 2
Thorpe series, FTC "Broad"series, andM&A "Domestic"
A longerperspective appears in figure 9.6,which presents annual
datathenumber of mergers from the Nelson, Thorpe, FTC, and
M&A"domestic" series. The data show four noticeable peaks or
"waves":" around theturnof the century,in the late 1920s, in the (ate Fig.
1960s,and in the 1980s. Thus, the merger wave of the 1980s is not an
entirely new phenomenon. Merger activity was significant in earlier
L.
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Numberof Mergers
Fig.9.5 Quarterly number of mergers and acquisitions: M&A "Do-
mestic" series, M&A "All" series, and Grimm series
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periods. The previous graphs have provided merger data in terms of
absolute numbers and real values. But the real size of the U.S. economy
has grown substantially over the period covered. Consequently, the
opportunities for mergers may have increased, and the relative impor-
tance of any particular merger of a given real size has clearly diminished
over time. Accordingly, the merger data should be placed in a suitable
historical context.
One possible measure for comparison would be a consistent time
series on the number of business enterprises in the United States. This
measure might proxy the possible opportunities for mergers among
firms. Unfortunately, we were unable to find a satisfactory series that
covers the entire period.
Instead, we have used real GNP as our comparison measure. By
dividing the absolute number of mergers each year by the real GNP of
that year, we achieve a relative measure that is the ratio of two flow
measures: the annual number of mergers and acquisitions per billion
dollars of real GNP. Figure 9.7 provides the time series for this relative
measure (with real GNP measured in terms of billions of 1982 dollars).
As can be seen, the peaks of merger activity at the turn of the century
and in the late l920s were much more important relative to the size of
the economy at those times than has been true in the l980s)2
The pattern displayed in figure 9.7 does not incorporate information
on the size of the pool of companies that were candidates for mergers
or the sizes of those firms. As we noted above, a time series covering
'Do-
Number of Mergers per
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Annual number of mergers and acquisitions per billion dollars
of Real GNP (in 1982 dollars): Nelson series, Thorpe series,
FTC"Broad"series, and M&A "Domestic" series274Devra L. Golbeand LawrenceJ. White 275
thesecharacteristics is not available for a suitably long period. But Valueo
dataare available for the period since the late 1930s. As can be seen
in table 9.1, the number of registered corporations in the U.S. economy
0
hasincreased appreciably faster since 1939 than has the level of real
GNP.13 These relative increases held equally true for the period of the 0125
1960s(the previous merger boom) through the early 1980s. Thus, the
pattern shown in figure 9.7 overstates the relative importance of merg- 0.100
ersin the l980s as compared with the previous four decades if the pool
of available merger partners is used as the basis of comparison. Because 0.075
wedo not have comparable data for the period before 1939, we can
make no definitive statements about comparisons with the earlier merger 0.050
peaks.But we strongly suspect that similar conclusions would hold for
a longer period of comparison. 0025
Further,the data in table 9. 1 indicate that the average real size (as
represented by sales expressed in 1982 dollars) of the firms in the
available pooi has been remarkably stable, except for a temporary
0
increasein the mid-1940s that lasted until the mid-1950s. Thus, the
conclusions that we drew with respect to the size of the available pool Fig. 9
of merger partners are equally valid with respect to the size of the pool
expressed in terms of the real value of sales.
A more direct measure of the relative importance of mergers, as
measured by the annual value of merger transactions, is presented in
figure 9.8; Here we have used the GNP deflator to achieve a measure
Table9.1 Numbersof Corporations, TheirRealSizes, and Real GNP,
1939—82
Average sales
Number of per corporation Real GNP
corporations (in millions of 1982 (in billions
Year (in thousands) doltarst) of 1982 dollars)
1939 470 2.23 717
1940 473 2.41 773
1945 421 3.86 1,355
1950 629 3.05 1,204
1955 807 2.92 1,495
1960 1,141 2.40 1,665
1965 1,424 2.48 2.088
1970 1,665 2.50 2,416
1975 2,024 2.66 2,695
1980 2,711 2.74 3,187
1982 2,926 2.40 3,166
1983 2,999 2.23 3,279
Sources; U.S. Department of Commerce (1976); U.S. Department of Commerce, Sta-
tistical Abstract, various years.





































of the real annual value of mergers and have then divided that by real
GNP.'4 The pattern shown in figure 9.8 is consistent with that of
figure 9.7: The merger wave at the turn of the century was much larger
relative to the size of the economy than was the wave of the late 1960s
or the wave, thus far, of the 1980s.
9.2.4Data on Aggregate Concentration
The time series in figures 9.7 and 9.8, which show that the data on
the absolute numbers and values of mergers and acquisitions in the
1980s may give a misleading impression as to their relative importance
in the U.S. economy, are echoed by another set of data: recent cal-
culations of the trends in aggregate concentration in the U.S. economy.
Aggregate concentration is a measure of the percentage of some
aggregate economic variable (such as assets, employment, sales, value
added) accounted for by the largest X (such as 100, 200,...) firmsin
the nation's economy. Comparisons of aggregate concentration over
time indicate the rate at which the largest firms in the economy have
been growing (including growth through merger) relative to the size of
the overall economy. Since the aggregate concentration measure tran-
scends (by far) the boundaries of economic markets, it has no use as
an indication of competitiveness. Instead, it may provide some indi-
cation of the concentration (and trends in concentration over time) of
social aPid political power that may reside in a comparative handful of
r
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Sta-Table 9.2 Aggregate Concentration in the Manufacturing Sec
Measured by Value Added, 1947—82 (in percent)
tor, as
Largest
companies 1947 1954 1958 1963 1967 1972 1977 1982
50 17 23 23 25 25 25 24 24
100 23 30 30 33 33 33 33 33
200 30 37 38 41 42 43 44 44
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of
various years.
largecompanies and their managers—one of the main concerns that
have been expressed about mergers.'5
Since aggregate concentration measures are affected by internal
growth as well as by mergers, there is no simple linkage between
mergers and aggregate concentration. Nevertheless, aggregate con-
centration data may yield some support for the impressions we have
gained from the merger data.
Table 9.2 provides data on postwar aggregate concentration (as mea-
sured by value added) for the manufacturing sector of the U.S. econ-
omy. Aggregate concentration rose through the early 1960s but has
remained stable since then, despite the merger wave of the 1960s and
the early 1980s. (The increases through the early 1960s were primarily
the result of internal growth by large firms in industries that were
expanding—for example, motor vehicles, petroleum, tires, chemicals,
electrical equipment—rather than of mergers.) This stability, then, is
consistent with the relatively modest role that mergers seem to have
recently played in the U.S. economy.
The manufacturing sector, however, is only a quarter of U.S. GNP
and has been declining in relative importance. Thus, a wider measure
of aggregate concentration would be useful.
Table 9.3 provides data on aggregate concentration across the entire
private sector of the U.S. economy, as measured by employment and
by corporate profits.'6 The data, compiled from the Fortune magazine
lists of the 1,000 largest manufacturing and mining companies and the
50 largest companies in each of six services areas, indicate that aggre-
gate concentration as measured by employment declined over the pe-
riod 1972—80. The profits measure shows a general decline through
1979 but then a sharp increase in 1980. It is likely that this last move-
ment was simply a temporary consequence of the increase in oil prices
in 1979 and their effects on oil company profits, rather than a reversal
of the trend. (The continued downward trend in employment concen-
tration in 1980 supports this interpretation.)














































Share of nonfarrn private sector employment
100 18.2 — — — — 17.3 — l6.7 l6.6
200 23.9 — — — — 22.7 — 22.6 22.!
.300 37.3 37.4 37.0 36.5 36.1 35.5 34.7 34.2 34.0
Share of corporate profits after taxes
00 43.3 — — — 39.8 — 39.4 44.9
200 55,4— — — — 50.2 — 49.9 56.5
1,300 76.6 75.1 72.67l.4 73.8 71.4 70.47I.l 75.6
Source: White (l981b).
Table 9.4 Aggregate Concentrationin the Entire Private Sector, asMeasured
by Employment and by Assets,1970—84(in percent)
Largest
companies 1970 1975 1980 1984
Share of nonfarmprivate sector employment
25 10.2 9.9 8.9 7.4
100 18.8 17.7 16.6 I5.l
200 24.5 23.3 22.! 20.5
Share of assets of nonfinancial corporations
25 16.9 17.0 16.0 12.7
100 29.1 29.2 28.0 26.6
200 37.9 37.7 35.9 34.1
Unfortunately, subsequent changes in the way the Fortune lists are
compiled make extensions of the 1972—80 data difficult. But the U.S.
Department of Justice has recently compiled similar aggregate con-
centration calculations that yield comparisons through 1984. These data
are shown in table 9•4•17 The data in this table tell a similar story to
that told by the data covering the l970s: Aggregate concentration has
not risen, and probably has declined modestly, despite the merger wave
of the 1980s.
In sum, aggregate concentration data, both for the manufacturing
sector alone and for the entire private business sector, are consistent
with the merger data in figures 9.7 and 9.8. Thus, although the absolute
numbers and values of mergers in the 1980s are impressive, they are
r
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Table 9.3 Aggregate Concentration in the Entire Private Sector, as Measured
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still relatively modest when placed in the context of the size of the chan
U.S. economy of the 1980s. rate
9.3Previous Time-Series Studies of Mergers and Acquisitions 9.3.4
As we noted in the introduction, the previous literature that employed B(
time-series analyses of mergers and acquisitions has been sparse. We valu
now offer a brief review of that literature.8 tryir
secu
9.3. 1Weston ican
Weston (1953) examined annual merger data for the period between 93i
thetwo World Wars. Employing a multiple regression analysis, he found
that mergers were significantly and positively related to securities prices C
and to wholesale commodity prices but were not significantly related expl
to industrial production levels. mer
cant
9.3.2Nelson grad
Nelson (1959) looked at quarterly merger data stretching from 1895 and
through 1956, with his primary focus on the years 1895—1920. Much thei
of his book is spent on describing the sources and methodology he of ti
usedin compiling his 1895—1920 data and the descriptive qualities of effe
those data. Nelson did, however, explore a number of hypotheses
concerning the origins and motives underlying the mergers of the pe-
riod. He rejected the propositions that the mergers were a consequence
of a slowdown in growth of the U.S. economy or of decreases in bet
transportation costs. He did find that the achievement of market power enc
and the development of the U.S. securities markets appeared to have late
played a role in encouraging the mergers. As an "indirect" way (ne
testing this proposition, Nelson calculated and discovered a significant 9.3
positive correlation between quarterly merger data and the level of
securities prices.'9 He also calculated the correlation between mergers
and the level of industrial production, but here he found an insignificant
194
relationship between the two. When Nelson extended his analysis to bes
quarterly merger data for the longer period 1895—1954, he uncovered dii
the same quantitative results: Securities prices were significantly and rej
positively related to the mergers, but the relationship between mergers Th
and industrial production was insignificant.
9.3.3Steiner at
Steiner (1975, chap. 8) used multiple regression analysis to try to
9 3 explain annual merger activity (numbers and value) from 1949 through
the early 1970s. For the years 1949—71 he found that GNP and the
change in the level of securities prices both had significant positive Gu
influences; the prime rate of interest had a positive but insignificant 19
effect.2° When he added data for 1972 to the analysis, Steiner saw the un
iL279A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
the change in securities prices variable become insignificant, and the prime
rate of interest showed a significant positive effect.
9.3.4Beckenstein
d Beckenstein (1979) examined annual data on merger numbers and
values for the years 1949—75. Using multiple regression analysis and
e trying a number of variables, he found that only the nominal level of
securities prices and the nominal interest rate had consistently signif-
icant effects; but the interest rate effects were consistently positive.
een 9.3.5Chung and Weston
UI( Chung and Weston (1982) employed multiple regression analysis to
ited explore the determinants of the annual number of large conglomerate
mergers. They found that these mergers were positively and signifi-
cantly related to the difference between yields on lower and higher
grade corporate bonds, the ratio of short- to long-term bond yields,
895 and the rate of growth of GNP; the mergers were negatively related to
uch the rate of return on corporate bonds. When they used Tobin's q instead
he of the last two variables, the authors found a positive and significant
s of effect.
ses 9.3.6Melicher, Ledolter, and D'Antonio
Melicher and his colleagues (1983) examined quarterly merger data
between 1947 and 1977. Using "prewhitened" logarithmic first differ-
ver ence transformations, they found that mergers were significantly re-
ave lated to lagged stock prices (positively) and to lagged bond yields
(negatively) but not to industrial activity or to business failure levels.2'
ant Shugart and Tollison
of
ers In an analysis of annual merger data for the years 1895—1920 and
ant 1947—79, Shugart and Tollison (1984) concluded that the series could
to best be described as generated by a "white-noise process with possible
red drift" or by a "stable first-order autoregressive scheme," and they
Lnd rejected the characterization of the merger data as occurring in waves.
ers They did not, however, explicitly test a wave hypothesis, nor did they
specifically show why their findings were inconsistent with a wave
characterization. We will offer a more specific test of a wave hypothesis
at the end of section 9.5.
to
igh 9.3.8Guerard
the Using procedures similar to those of Melicher and his colleagues,
lye Guerard (1985) examined quarterly merger data for the years 1895—
mt 1950. He found that mergers were positively related to stock prices but
:he unrelated to the level of industrial production.280 DevraL. Golbeand LawrenceJ. White 281
9.3.9Becketti Barg
Becketti (1986) used quarterly data on the number and value of As
mergers from 1960 through 1985. Using ordinary least squares regres- the
sions and emphasizing the lagged values of the explanatory variables, djca
he found that mergers and acquisitions were in general influenced pos-
itively by securities prices, negatively by real interest rates, positively marl
by the general level of debt in the economy, positively by the level of sets.
capital utilization, and negatively by real GNP; but the statistical sig- plac
nificance of his findings was not strong, except for the influence of hem
GNP.
desi
9.3.10 A Summing Up whe
For a period of more than 30 years, the literature devoted to time-
series analysis of mergers and acquisitions has not been large. A few ne
variables have consistently appeared as potential explanatory influ-
ences: measures of economic activity (for example, GNP or industrial
production), interest rates (or bond yields), and securities prices. The som
first and third variables have usually been found to be positively related suci
to merger activity, while the second has exhibited both signs. In most the
instances, however, the theoretical justifications offered for the inclu-
is
sion of these (and other) variables in the analyses conducted have not but
been strong. sell
In the next section we offer a more complete theoretical model of In
the merger and acquisition process. We will agree that aggregate activity slig
and interest rates should influence merger activity, with a positive effect cas
for the first and a negative effect for the second. But we are suspicious 1ev
of the role usually assigned to securities prices. We now turn to the
q fi






9.4.1The Determinants of Merger and Acquisition Activity
A merger or acquisition usually constitutes an act of investment by (be
the purchasing firm or individuals. But a merger or acquisition is also tha
an exchange of existing assets (for example, a purchaser pays cash for bel
the plant, equipment, personnel, and goodwill of an existing firm), the
whereas investment flows (at least, as defined by the GNP accounts) we
involve the creation of new plant and equipment. Consequently, we bu
will focus primarily on the forces that cause individuals or firms to
exchange assets among themselves, and we will draw somewhat on the det
existing literature on asset exchanges.22 fin281A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
Bargains
Asset exchanges should occur when potential purchasers believe that
es- the current prices for the assets constitute "bargains." One rough in-
es dicator of whether a company can be purchased at a bargain price
Os- would be a comparison of the company's purchase price (for instance,
ely market value) with the likely replacement costs of the company's as-
sets—that is, Tobin's q.23 The lower the ratio of market value to re-
placement cost (other things being equal), the greater the bargain and
of hence the greater the likelihood that some potential purchaser will step
forward and make the purchase. Equivalently, for a given level of
desired aggregate investment, merger activity is likely to be greater
when the prices of existing firms are low relative to the prices of new
assets, since mergers and acquisitions are alternatives to purchases of
new assets. Thus, the level of q for the economy should be an important
ew negative influence on the aggregate level of merger and acquisition
lu- activity.24
ial Our approach focuses on the demand side of merger transactions,
he somewhat neglecting the supply side. For simpler asset exchanges—
such as of an office building—this neglect might not be justified. When
ost the prices of office buildings fall below their replacement costs (that
lu- is, this q is below 1.0), potential buyers should be looking for bargains;
lot but when their prices rise above their replacement costs, potential
sellers should be looking for possibilities to sell out at favorable prices.
In the former case, the buyers may be willing to offer prices that are
ity slightly above prevailing levels in order to expedite a sale; in the latter
ct case, the sellers may be willing to shade their prices below prevailing
US levelsto expedite sales. In any event, the volume of transactions and
he q for these kinds of simple assets are unlikely to be correlated.
For the case of publicly traded firms, the process we have just de-
scribed should hold when q falls below 1.0. Indeed, to achieve mergers,
prospective buyers appear to be willing to offer substantial premiums
above preannouncement market prices. By contrast, however, if a com-
pany's securities are selling at a q above 1.0 and the company's man-
agers believe that the times are propitious for selling the company
by (because, for example, they have inside information or strong beliefs
so that the future prospects of the company are not as rosy as the market
'or believes), they will have trouble expediting the sale by offering to sell
ri), the company at a price below the current market value.25 Accordingly,
ts) we believe that focusing on reported mergers as driven largely by the
buyers' side of the transaction is justified.
to This expectation that q should be an important (and negative)
he determinant of merger activity is consistent with recent cross-sectional
findings on the characteristics of takeover targets.26 It should beI
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notedthat this negative relationship implies that, ceterisparibus, there
there should be a negative relationship between mergers and securities woul
prices. This prediction is in sharp contrast to the expectations ex- beco
pressed in (and empirical findings of) the earlier literature that mergers timis
and securities prices should be positively related. Our examination likel'
of that literature has uncovered few valid theoretical arguments for cann
a positive relationship.27 Melicher, Ledolter, and D'Antonio, for ex- divei
ample, posited that securities prices are indicators of "expectations lead
of economic growth" and hence that higher levels of securities prices Aco
should be conducive to mergers. Since a merger requires a price that forri
is satisfactory to both buyer and seller, this hypothesis implicitly in re
assumes that buyers are more influenced by the expectations provided futu
by securities prices than are sellers. We see no necessary reason
why this should be so. The
Our hypothesis that a low value of q should indicate a bargain is at T
hand and hence encourage mergers implies a simultaneous relationship exp
between q and mergers: A high level of mergers (ceteris paribus) should hay
cause q to increase.28 Consequently, in our estimation procedures be- mig
low we include simultaneous equations methods that incorporate the that
determinants of q. We should note here that it is not within the scope firm
of this paper to try to develop and estimate a complete model of q. wol
Rather, the important insight is that when q is relatively low (for what- cap
ever reason, including a low level of mergers) bargains will appear; oft
this in turn will encourage mergers, which will tend to increase q; and cap
so on.
Unexpected Changes in Economic Circumstances
As economic circumstances change unexpectedly29—for instance, as wit
relative prices among the major sectors of the economy change—dif- ac
ferent entrepreneurial skills may become valuable and differential profit
T opportunities may arise.30 For example, as relative energy prices in-
crease, the skills required to operate an airline, a chemical factory, a I
petroleum refinery, or a gasoline marketing facility may change. Fur- md
ther, opportunities for greater (or lesser) economies of scale, economies alt
of scope, or economies of vertical integration may arise. Mergers and an
acquisitions are one way of achieving the changes in ownership and an
management that can take advantage of these changed opportunities. ob
Divergences of Opinion A
As noted above, mergers require buyers and sellers to agree upon a
mutually satisfactory price. If differences of opinion about future profit fix
prospects widen, two effects are possible: First, there is a greater mt
likelihood that a relatively optimistic buyer will find a relatively pes- tin
simistic seller and a transaction can be completed. Second, however, CO283 ATime-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
ibus, thereis also a greater likelihood that a buyer-seller pair that previously
rities would have found a merger worthwhile will find that the buyer has
ex- become relatively pessimistic or the seller has become relatively op-
gers timistic about its own future profit prospects, and the merger is less
ition likely to be completed.3' Since the two effects offset each other, we
s for cannot offer a precise theoretical prediction as to the net effect of
• ex- divergences of opinion on mergers. Our prior expectations, however,
ions lead us to predict that the first effect should dominate the second.
ices Accordingly, we expect that periods with increased flows of new in-
that formation that create divergent opinions32 or periods of greater changes
citly in relative prices (which could yield differential expectations about the
ided future) should be periods with larger numbers of mergers.
ison
The Real Cost of Capital
is at The real cost of capital can influence the timing, financing costs, and
ship expected profitability of mergers and acquisitions and hence should
)uld have a negative relationship with the volume of these transactions. It
be- might also be the case, however, that in credit crunches small firms
the that face liquidity problems may become takeover targets by larger
ope firms that have easier access to capital markets;33 this latter hypothesis
f q. would imply a positive relationship between mergers and the cost of
hat- capital. Our prior is that the former effect should dominate. A measure
ear; of the real rate of interest is likely to be a good proxy for the cost of
and capital.
The Size of the Economy
A larger economy is likely to have more companies that could merge




a In addition to the effects that changes in the tax laws can have in
ur- inducing mergers and acquisitions over a short- to medium-run period,
Lies alternative tax regimes can make asset exchanges more or less costly
md and hence have steady-state consequences for the volume of mergers
md and acquisitions. Tax laws involving inheritances and capital gains are
es. obvious examples.
A Correction Factor for the Fixed Cutoff Point Problem
ii a As we discussed in section 9.2 above, in the presence of inflation a
fit fixed lower cutoff point for the inclusion of a merger or acquisition
ter into a recorded data series creates an upward bias in that series over
time. Any empirical testing of the previous hypotheses must include a
er, correction factor for this upward bias.284Devra L. Golbe and Lawrence 3. White 285
A Summing Up Table 9
The exchange-of-assets view of mergers developed above indicates




2. Changes in economic circumstances (including changes in relative
prices and changes in tax regimes)
3. Greater divergences of opinions about future economic prospects
2A
4.The real cost of capital
5. The size of the economy
FT 6. The tax regime
7. A corrective factor for the cutoff point bias
9.5Methodology, Data, and Results Note:
Totest the hypotheses advanced in the previous section, we em-
3
ployedstandard time-series regression analysis using some of the data q.
series described in section 9.2. q.
9.5.1The Dependent Variables The
The FTC "large firm" series, reporting the number of mergers in 'Ii
the manufacturing and mining sectors in which the assets of the ac- this
quired company were at least $10 million and information concerning por
the merger was publicly available, was our choice for the dependent COfl
variable in our analyses of quarterly data. This is a widely used series, GN
and it offers the maximum number of observations and overlap with mei
potential explanatory variables. These data cover the quarters 1948.1 No
though 1979.4. For our analyses of annual data we chose the FTC
"broad" series. These data cover the years 1940—79. In an effort to 1
extend both these series and include data that cover the merger wave COt
of the 1980s, we spliced each of the FTC series with the "domestic sen
merger" series from Mergers & Acquisitions. In each case we isolated
the overlapping data of the FTC and M&A series and ran least squares
regressions (including a first order autoregressive term). These regres- to
sion equations are shown in table 9.5. We then employed the coeffi- Ta cients from these regressions to extrapolate the FTC series forward




The Ratio of Market Value to Replacement Cost (q) co
This variable represents our bargain hypothesis. For the quarterly all
regressions we tried both unadjusted and tax-adjusted measures of an
k285 A Time-SeriesAnalysis of Mergersand Acquisitions

















data q.34Fortheannual regressions we used only unadjusted measures of
q.35 We expect this variable to have a negative effect on merger activity.
The Real Rate of Interest
rs This variable represents our cost-of-capital hypothesis. To construct
e ac- this variable, we used the interest rate on seasoned, Aaa-rated cor-
rning porate bonds during a quarter (or a year) and then subtracted the
ident concurrent inflation rate (as measured by the percentage change in the
!ries, GNP deflator). We expect this variable to have a negative effect on
with mergers.
948.1 Nominal GNP
rt to This variable represents both the size of the real economy and a
wave correction factor for the upward bias in the construction of the merger
estic series. In addition, we decomposed this variable into its separate com-
lated ponents—real GNP and the GNP deflator—and entered them sepa-
tares t-ately into the regressions.36 We expect this variable (and its components)
gres- to have a positive effect on mergers.
)effi-
ward Tax Regimes
When unadjusted q was included in the regressions, we also included
dummy variables to capture the possible effects of different tax regimes
on mergers. We believe that the tax laws of 1954, 1963, and 1981 rep-
resent the major new regimes in the period covered by our data. Ac-
cordingly, we included 0,1 dummy variables separately for 1954 and
terly all subsequent quarters or years, for 1963 and all subsequent periods,
of and for 1981 and all subsequent periods;286 DevraL. Golbe and Lawrence J. White 287
Changesin Relative Prices Sin
This variable represents our hypothesis concerning changed eco- exog(
nomic circumstances. For each month we computed the variance of expec
the percentage price changes of the major components of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics wholesale price index (and, subsequently, timat
the producer price index).37 We then averaged these monthly variances residi
into quarterly values.38 Since larger variances should represent greater GNP
changes in economic circumstances, we expect this variable to have a
4
positive effect on mergers.
Tal
Divergences of Opinion avera
This variable represents our effort to capture the effects of new (For
information that creates divergences of opinion. To construct this van- Tal
able, we used the Livingston data base, which contains a semiannual terly
time series of separate forecasts for a number of macroeconomic van- merg
ables by a panel of forecasters.39 We computed the cross-sectional data I
varianceof the one-year-out forecasts of the consumer price index40
for each semiannual period and then computed the coefficient of vari-
ation for each semiannual period. For our quarterly estimates we used
T bi these semiannual observations or interpolated the in-between quarters
by averaging the semiannual observations for the preceding and fol- Vanab
lowingquarters. Since a higher value for this variable indicates greater SYmb0
of opinion among forecasters, we expect this variable to NFTC
havea positive effect on mergers.
NFTC
9.5.3The Simultaneity between Mergers and q.
BFTC
Tothe extent that the aggregate level of merger and acquisition ac- BFTC
tivityaffects the market value of companies (the numerator of q), there
is a simultaneous relationship between mergers and q. Accordingly,
some discussion of this simultaneity is warranted. unadq
Sinceq is a ratio of prices at discrete points in time, whereas merger ri
andacquisition activity is measured as a flow over time, it is the change NGNJ
inq that should be affected by the flow of mergers. It is easy to show RGNP
that DEFL
q, — (iW—q,1iXK)/K,, VRPC
where V is the market value of the capital stock, and K is the replace- CVLF
ment cost of that capital stock. Sinceis current investment, we
can posit a simple accelerator or capital stock adjustment model of D1954,
investment, in which real GNP and real interest rates are the primary
determinants of investment. The change in market value should be 1948.:
related to merger activity and to unexpected changes in future profits h194$
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I
Since real GNP and real interest rates are already in the model as
exogenous variables explaining mergers, we used estimates of the un-
expected changes in future profits and in interest rates as our excluded
exogenous instruments for the purposes of simultaneous equations es-
timation of the merger model. To obtain these estimates, we used the
residuals from first order ARIMA estimation models involving real
GNP and real interest rates.4'
9.5.4Regression Results
Table 9.6 provides the list of variables, their symbols, and their
average values for the quarterly observations 1948.3 through 1984.1
(For the dependent variables, annual averages are also provided.)
Tables 9.7 and 9.8 present our main regression results for the quar-
terly data. The first table provides OLS regressions using the FTC
merger data for 1948.3—1979.4 and using the spliced FTC—M&A merger
data for 1948.3—1984.1; the second table presents two-stage least squares





NFTC Quarterly number of mergers, FTC "large firm"
series
16.l"
NFTCMA NFTC spliced with the quarterly "domestic" series
from M&A
16.1
BFTC Annual number of mergers. FTC "broad" series 787.0"
BFTCMA BFTC spliced with the annual "domestic" series
from M&A
733.9'
taxadq Tax-adjusted Tobin's q 0.41
unadq Unadjusted q 0.91
ri Real interest rate I .88
NGNP Nominal GNP, in billions of dollars $1,145
RGNP Real GNP, in billions of 1982 dollars $2,184
DEFL GNP deflator, 1982 =1.0 0.46
VRPC Variance of the relative price changes of the
industrial components of the wholesale price index
0.79
CVLFC Coefficient of variation of the Livingston panel
forecasts of the consumer price index
0.02
D1954, etc. Dummy variabletaking the value ofI for all
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estimates of the same models. In all cases we included first and second
order autoregressive terms.42 to Capt
The OLS results in table 9.7 indicate that the autoregressive terms of new
are the most powerful explanatory factors. Nominal GNP always has satisfa
a positive effect and is usually significant; when it is broken into its
two constituent components, neither has a significant effect (and the
price level even has a slight negative effect). Real interest rates always The
have a negative effect, but are never significant. The q variable, whether that m
in its tax-adjusted or -unadjusted form, always has a positive effect—. listed
contrary to our expectations—and is significant. And the relative price nifican
variation and Livingston forecast variation variables are never signif- Shuga
icant, although the forecast variable has the expected sign. The dummy IflCOflS
variables constructed to capture the differing tax regimes (when the that n
unadjusted q is used) do not add any explanatory power to the autore
equations, do not
The two-stage least squares results in table 9.8 yield similar conclu- price
sions. Indeed, the coefficients for the 2SLS estimations are quite similar ifl a ii
to their OLS counterparts, indicating that the instrumental values for prices
q are quite close to their actual values.43 Thus, the 2SLS estimations period
do not appreciably affect or improve the explanatory power of the today'
models. Shu
In table 9.9 we provide results of OLS estimations based on annual lyzing
Again, the same basic conclusions emerge. For the annual data, next
though, nominal GNP is insignificant as well, but real GNP does have levels
the expected significant positive effect. We
When we transform all of the relevant quarterly data series into respe
logarithms and reestimate the models of tables 9.7 and 9.8, we again knowi
find the same basic results. When we transform the annual series,
however, we find somewhat stronger results. Table 9.10 shows these predi(
annual log-log OLS estimations. Nominal GNP now has a strong and if
significant positive effect, and real interest rates have a significant neg- first q
ative effect for the full 1948—85 period, levels
We estimated the same models for quarterly and annual data, with no. Ii
the value of mergers as the dependent variable, with the same basic of me
results. We also tried logged values of the independent variables, again
with the same basic results. As
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results presented rnetn
in tables 9.7—9.10. First, the merger series follow a strongly autore- sisten
gressive pattern. But our efforts to uncover the more fundamental merp
economic forces underlying this pattern have been only moderately rando
successful. The size of the economy has a positive effect on mergers, high
as expected, and real interest rates appear to have a negative effect, each
especially when the model is estimated using annual data. But q has a Thesi293A Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
significant positive effect, contrary to our hypotheses. And our efforts
to capture the effects of changes in the structure of the economy and
of new information that could yield divergences of opinion do not yield
satisfactory results.
9.5.5AreThere Merger Waves?
The data we described in section 9.2 suggest to us, and to others,
that mergers occur in waves. Indeed, Brealey and Myers (1984) have
listed the lack of an explanation for merger waves as one of ten sig-
nificant unsolved problems in finance. But as we noted in section 9.3,
Shugart and Tollison (1984) argued that the merger time-series data are
inconsistent with a wave characterization. Their statistical results imply
that merger levels follow a random walk or, at most, a first order
autoregressive process. From this the authors concluded that mergers
do not occur in waves. Implicit in their reasoning is an analogy to stock
price data. Although a cursory look suggests that stock prices move
in a nonrandom pattern, the statistical evidence indicates that stock
prices follow a random walk: Price changes are uncorrelated from one
period to the next, so that the best estimate of tomorrow's price is
today's' price.
Shugart and Tollison appear to have adopted this reasoning in ana-
lyzing merger data. They concluded that, since the best estimate of
next year's level of mergers is this year's level, the patterns of merger
levels are also meaningless.
We believe, however, that the analogy is flawed. The question with
respect to stock prices is, can we predict tomorrow's price change by
knowing today's price change? The relevant question with respect to
mergers is, instead, if the number of mergers this year is high, can we
predict that the number of mergers next year will also be high? Surely,
if stock price changes are uncorrelated over time, the answer to the
first question is no. It is not true, however, that if changes in merger
levels over time are uncorrelated the answer to the second question is
no. Indeed, one could argue that, if the best predictor of the number
of mergers in year Iisthe number in year t— I,mergers do come in
waves.
As an alternative test of this hypothesis, we employed a nonpara-
metric "runs" test. Arguably, the pattern of mergers would be con-
sistent with a wave hypothesis if the periods when the numbers of
mergers were relatively high and relatively low were not distributed
randomly but instead were bunched in adjoining periods of relatively
high and relatively low activity. To test this proposition, we regressed
each quarterly and annual merger series against a simple time trend.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sTable 9.10 Annual OLS Results, with All Relevant Variables in Logs
Independent
variable
log BFTC(1948—79) log BFTCMA (1948—85)





















































D-W 2.1 2.l 2.0 2.0
0.86 0.87 0.75 0.69
each equation and counted any positive deviation as a "plus" and any
negative deviation as a "minus." We then counted the number of runs
of pluses and minuses and compared the number found to the number
that would be expected from a random distribution. For all four cases
the number of runs was significantly below the expected number.45
These results are also shown in table 9.11.
Accordingly, we believe, contrary to Shugart and Tollison, that the
merger data are consistent with a wave characterization.
9.6Conclusions
In this paper we have developed hypotheses concerning the economic
factors that should explain the pattern of mergers and acquisitions and
subjected those hypotheses to econometric tests on postwar merger
data. Along the way we reviewed the previous literature, described the
strengths and weaknesses of the various merger series that are available
for analysis, and provided a historical perspective on the long-run pat-
tern of mergers in the U.S. economy.
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Table9.11 Runs Tests of a Merger Wave Hypothesis
—85) Quarterly data:
— I.1948.1—1979.4 (128 observations)
NFTC= 3.12 + 0.19TIME
6.29 (2.0)(9.4)
(5.7) D-W = 0.58
2.1 =0.41
12.2) Expected numberofruns =61; standard deviation = 5.3
0.15 Actualnumber of runs =37





Expected number of runs =74;standard deviation =5.9.
Actual number of runs =47
Annual data:
3. 1940—79 (40 observations)




2.0 Expected nOmber of runs =21;standard deviation =3.I.
0.69 Actual number of runs =7
— 4.1940—85 (46 observations)




iber Expectednumberof runs =23;standard deviation =3.2
Actual number of runs =5 ases
er.45 Note: t-statistics in parentheses
the Our econometric results are only mildly encouraging. Especially puz-
zling to us is the apparently strong positive effect of Tobin's q on
mergers. Although this result is consistent with the other researchers'
empirical findings that securities prices have a positive effect on merg-
ers, we believe it to be inconsistent with the predictions of economic
mic theory. We are thus left with an unresolved puzzle.
and We have, however, offered a more specific test of a wave hypothesis
rger for time-series merger activity, and we believe that, contrary to the
the claims of others, the time-series pattern of mergers is consistent with
able a wave characterization.
pat- But the task of achieving a better understanding of the economic
forces underlying that pattern still lies ahead.298 Devra L. Golbe and Lawrence3.While 299
Notes 17.
mani
1. There has been a more extensive cross-section literature. For recent cross-
section studies see Harris, Steward, and Carleton (1982); Wansley. Roenfeldt, flum
and Cooley (1983); Hasbrouck (1985);andKnoeber (1986). Nels
2. A simple price index or deflator would work properly only if real merger
19
sizes were distributed uniformly. and
3. To the extent that merger values are recorded in terms of historical book 20
value (as is true for the FTC series discussed below), the bias due to the pure
21
inflation effect will not be as severe, for s
4. The last report, covering 1979 and earlier years, is U.S. FTC (1981).
22
5. Curiously, the FTC also published information on the value of the acquired
• assets in mergers for which public information was not available, but it did not
si
• publish annual data on the numbers of these mergers. influ
6. The annual data can be found in U.S. Department of Commerce (1976) Epp
and in various annual issues of the FTC's StatisticalReport on Mergersand Star
Acquisitions. The quarterly data can be found in Nelson (1959, 167—69). 23
7. Unfortunately, the annual and quarterly series are not consistent with phy
each other. The annual series appears to be more complete. 24
8. Nelson described the transactions as and the book value cros
as "capitalizations". 25
9. See Brooks (1973). pani
10. The GNPdeflator,with 1982 = 1.0, was used to deflate the nominal 2
dollar series. This procedure is imperfect, for the reasons discussed in the text seei
above. Jen:
II. Shugart and Tollison (1984) argue that waves are not a good character- fina
ization of the historical pattern of mergers and acquisitions. For our discussion 1.0
of their article, see Section III below. 1.0
12. As Nelson (1959, 25—29) pointed out, the Thorpe data appear to be more pur
inclusive than are Nelson's. Thus, if Nelson's raw data were adjusted upward cor
to correspond roughly with the Thorpe and FTC series, the merger wave at that
the turn of the century would appear to be even larger in relation to the economy that
at that time and hence would also be yet larger in comparison with the merger use
waves later in this century. 2
13. We chose the number of corporations, rather than the larger number of ma'
business enterprises (including sole proprietorships and partnerships), for two j
reasons. First, the data for the former are more complete. Second, and more of i
important, as we noted in the text the reported merger data include only
transactions that are above a given size; since corporations are generally larger 2!
than sole proprietorships and partnerships, the former series appeared to be by
more comparable to the merger data.
14. We can divide the nominal values of mergers in a given year by the imp
nominal GNP of that same year, or, equivalently, we can use the ratio of real skil
values. 3
15. It is worth noting that the political concerns raised about the merger 3
wave of the l960s were of the same kind as those being raised in the 1980s. eve
See U.S. Federal Trade Commission (1969) and Mueller (1986). But
16. Employment (when multiplied by wages) and profits are the two most tast
important elements of value added. For further details on the computations info
that underlie table 9.3, see White (l981a, 1982).299 ATime-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions
17. The data on employment in table 9.4 were collected in a slightly different
manner from those in table 9.3 and hence are not strictly comparable.
18. In addition to the studies discussed below, we should also mention the
ross- survey article by Markham (1955), the effort by Eis (1969) to compile merger
èldt, number and value data for the 1920s, and the less quantitative analyses by
Nelson (1966), Maule (1968), and Eis (1970).
19. Nelson found this positive relationship for both the number of mergers
and the capitalization value of the mergers.
book 20. Steiner appears to have used nominal values in all instances.
pure 21. Melicher, Ledolter, and D'Antonio appear to have used nominal values
for stock prices and bond yields.
22. A merger or acquisition of a firm usually entails one extra element—
ured control over management—that other exchanges of assets (such as purchases
I not of smaller blocks of shares in a company) do not have. For a discussion of the
influences on the trading volume of shares of stock, see Epps (1975), Epps and
976) Epps (1976), Verrecchia (1981), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), and Smirlock and
and Starks (1985).
23. See Tobin (1969). To the' extent that replacement costs encompass only
with physical assets, this type of measure will ignore intangible goodwill.
24. Robert Taggart has pointed out that the bargain hypothesis may explain
alue cross-section results but may not apply to time-series data.
25. The owners and potential sellers of family-owned or closely held com-
panies might be able to shade selling prices so as to expedite mergers.
Inal 26. See Hasbrouck (1985). In addition, our expectations about the role of q
text seem to be consistent with the implications of the "free cash flow theory" of
Jensen (1986). To the extent that corporations are heavily laden with cash,
ter- financial markets are likely to value them at q levels that either are close to
SIOfl 1 .0 (because the replacement cost of a dollar of cash is one dollar) or are below
1.0 (because the market expects that many managers are likely to make foolish
ore purchases with the cash). In the latter case mergers and q will be negatively
'ard correlated, either because managers have indeed embarked on foolish mergers
e at that are financed by their free cash flow or because other firms have realized
imy that now is a good time to buy the targeted firms and put the cash to better
rger uses—ones that will yield higher returns for stockholders.
27. The "trapped equity" model—as offered, for example, by King (1986)—
r of may be an exception.
two 28. This increase in q is a pure price reaction and need not be a reflection
ore of increased market power. If mergers were also to yield increased market
nly power, there might be a yet greater rise in q.
ger 29. This hypothesis and the one that follows it are similar to that advanced
be by Gort (1969).
1. 30.Note that it is not the changed profit levels for different sectors that are
important but rather the new profit opportunities that may arise for different
real skills.
31. This point was suggested to us by Steven Salop.
ger 32. As an oversimplification, new information that has implications on which
everyone agrees should have effects solely on prices, with little or no trading.
But as Verrecchia (1981) pointed out, if individuals have different incomes,
Lost tastes, or portfolio goals, then even a consensus as to the implications of new ons information can lead to trading.
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33.This point was suggested to us by Alan Auerbach. Broo
34. The tax-adjusted q series come from Bernanke, Bohn, and Reiss (1985); Carls
the unadjusted series was provided by the authors of that paper. So
35.Thisseries is constructed from the data provided in U.S. Board of Chug
Governors (1986). a
36. As we noted in section 9.2, the simple use of the deflator is probably an Cu
imperfectcorrection factor.
37. We defined the percentage price changes to be differences in the natural Cuki
logarithms of the prices in two periods. We then computed a Divisia index of an
the weighted average of the percentage changes of the individual components. Ec
Finally,we computed the weighted variance of the individual rates of change
around this average. See Parks (1978). tio
38. The regressions reported here include a relative price change variable Eis,
based only on the "industrial commodity" components of the wholesale price na
• index and the producer price index. Including the raw materials components—
specifically, the energy sector—produced extremely large spikes in relative of
pricechanges in the l970s, and we were concerned that these observations Eppr
might be true outliers. When these components were included in the regres- or
sions, however, the basic results reported below were unchanged. Epps
39. For further discussion of the Livingston data base, see Carlson (1977), se
Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) and Cukierman and Wachtel (1982). of.
40. We also computed the variance of the forecasts for the wholesale price Fair,
index and for the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production. When en
these alternative variables were included in the regressions reported below, fri
thebasic results were unchanged. Gins
41. Further details on these equations are available from the authors. an
42. As suggested by Fair (1970), in the 2SLS estimations we also included se
the lagged values of all the exogenous and endogenous variables. Gori
43. We suspect that the use of the lagged variables as instruments, especially Jo
laggedq, may have caused this result. Guei
44. Since the OLS and 2SLS results for the quarterly data were so similar, Ai
we present only the OLS results for the annual data.
45.Thespliced data have an autoregressive structure imposed on the ex- Han
trapolated observations of the 1980s, which might bias the series toward show- ch
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ugust Comment Steven C. Salop
.1956 TheGolbe-White paper is, in a sense, two separate papers. The first
ernal presents an overview of the available time-series data on mergers and
s and acquisitions. The second provides an empirical study of the determi-
nants of merger activity over the past 35 years. After a few initial
a! of comments on the overview, my main comments will focus on the em-
acter pirical study.
The time-series overview is a very useful piece of work. Golbe and
stock White set out the various data series and work to splice the data sets
217— together. This was not a trivial task. Their resulting series allows us
to see the historical patterns more easily.
Un'- I found the most interesting result in this section to be that mergers
e re- havenot been as significant in the recent economy as they were in the
I past.The authors compare the number of mergers to real GNP and
Jour- show that this ratio was larger at the beginning of the century than in
h the recent past. One can quibble about the proper ratio to calculate
ee S here. The number of mergers does not control for the size of the average
merger; perhaps a better deflator would be a stock measure (for ex-
ample, total domestic wealth) rather than a flow measure like real GNP.
Nonetheless, the result is striking.
Golbe and White's empirical study focuses on the determinants of gers. aggregate merger activity. In contrast to most of the other papers in
this volume that analyze which mergers occur, Golbe and White study
how many mergers occur. Their study is thought provoking, but still
iand very preliminary.
ation More work is needed before we can draw strong conclusions about
Ab- thedeterminants of aggregate merger activity, for two reasons. First,
ative the authors' results are fairly weak. Many of the results were negative;
no relationship could be found. Second, the theory underlying the
empirical analysis was not fully developed.
ation This was primarily an empirical paper. The theory section consisted
of a list of independent variables and their expected signs. No model
ma!, was developed beyond this list. In particular, the hypotheses did not
flow from a general equilibrium model of financial markets with im-
perfect information about a stochastic economy, although that appar-
ce .1. ently is the model underlying the analysis.
This problem can be illustrated with two of the variables. According
to Golbe and White, asset exchanges occur when potential purchasers
perceive that current asset prices represent "bargains" in the market.
They measure this phenomenon by the economywide value of Tobin's
Steven C. Salop is professor of economics at the Georgetown University Law Center.304 DevraL. Golbe and Lawrence .1. White 305
q, the ratio of market value to replacement cost. Second, because Th
buyers and sellers must agree on a price, substantial divergence of asset
opinion in the economy should affect the likelihood of finding a mutually that,
acceptable price. More divergence of opinion probably leads to more chan
• mergers. The authors measure divergence of opinion by the variance mer1
among macroeconomic forecasts. These two variables should not be woul
• treated as separate ones, discussed independently. They both should the
flow out of an equilibrium model of expectation formation, where ex- C(
pectations are endogenous and depend on public as well as private that
information. byi
An asset is a bargain if its price is low relative to its expected price if thi
in the future, not relative to its replacement cost. Thus, the Tobin q is if ne
the correct variable for measuring bargains only if one believes that opin
buyers and sellers expect q to equal one in the near future. Instead, at som
the least, a proxy for expected q in the near future should have been in m
formulated. That should come out of a model of expectation formation. a va
An assumption of perfect foresight and thus the measurement of the lead
ratio of the current value of q relative to its actual future value would 0
have been a superior variable to examine, no d
Of course, this approach creates two additional simultaneity prob- exct
lems in expectation formation, even beyond the simultaneity problem pair
raised by the authors: that current merger activity raises future prices. N
First, expected future asset prices will determine current prices. Sec- valu
ond, buyers' and sellers' expectations are not independent. =
Thetheory of assets as bargains is incomplete without an analysis of z
of these issues. Consider for example, the implications of the fact that for
sellers also have expectations. If the ratio of current to future q implies In
bargains, then it is true that purchasers would desire to buy assets. Yet As
if these same expectations were held by potential sellers as well, the of t
transactions might not take place. wot
This possibility raises, of course, the issue of divergence of opinion, falls
First, I think divergence of opinion is not measured with the best tribi
variable. Because the real issue is differences of opinion regarding the G
future value of the assets, divergence in macroeconomic forecasts is the
not the best proxy. Better proxies might be divergence in stock market of r
forecasts.One simple variable might be the price of "straddle" options. rele
In a market where volatility is expected, straddles are more expensive. unsi
Second, Golbe and White treat that variable independently, rather
than fundamentally connected to the "bargains" variable. Yet the two
are intimately connected. A means that the purchaser thinks Kleii
the asset is undervalued at the price at which it is offered by the seller. 2.
The seller does not think it is a bargain, but a ripoff. In short, the two
parties have a divergence of opinion. corn
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luse The relationship between these variables can be seen in a model of
e of asset exchanges with imperfect information. Golbe and White suggest
ally that, though divergence could in principle reduce the number of ex-
'ore changes, they expect greater divergence of opinion to lead to more
ince mergers. Although Imayagree with their empirical intuition, it still
t be would be useful to set out a model to see the conditions under which
ould the effect could go the other way.
ex- Consider the following simple static model of exchange.' Suppose
vate that there are n potential buyer-seller "transactional pairs," indexed
by i 1,2,..., n.2A transactional pair will consummate an exchange
rice if the buyer's valueexceedsthe seller's reservation price s—that is,
q is if net surplus z =b1 — s,> 0. Even if there are no differences of
that opinion about the prospects for firms, bands, still could diverge, and
d, at some exchanges will occur, if the buyer has a comparative advantage
,een in managing the assets. Indeed, Golbe and White capture this idea with
tion. a variable that measures structural changes in the economy that might
the lead to shifting comparative advantages.
ould Consider first an economy with shifting comparative advantages but
no differences of opinion, and suppose that in this economy, m < n
rob- exchanges would occur, which we denote as the first m transactional
pairs, that is,> 0 for i= l,2,..., m.
ices. Now compare this to a more stochastic economy where the buyer's
Sec- value is given by b11= b, +13e1 and the seller's value is given by
=s,+ 13u1, whereand u, are random variables, each with a mean
lysis of zero, and 13 is a non-negative multiplier. (The initial economy is given
that for 13 =0.)Consider the effect of increasing 13toa positive number.
plies In this new 13 > 0 economy, exchanges occur only if z11 = — Sn> 0.
• Yet As a result, some of the m exchanges would no longer occur and some
the of the n —mtransactional pairs that failed to reach agreement now
would succeed. Whether the aggregate number of exchanges rises or
tion. falls depends on the relative sizes of fiandm and the underlying dis-
best tribution oflocally and globally.
g the Golbe and White's intuition is based on the idea that if m is small,
sts is the number of disrupted exchanges will be small; in contrast, the pool
arket of potential new exchanges is large. In fact, for a small 13,whatis
ions, relevant is the relative numbers of marginally successful and marginally
sive. unsuccessful transactional pairs, not the aggregate numbers. For ex-
ather ample, if the initial density ofwere symmetric with a local maximum
two I.This model draws heavily on the model of litigation settlement behavior devised by
lInks Klein and Priest (1984). See also Perloff and Rubinfeld (1988).
eller. 2.For simplicity,assume thateach buyer and each seller are involvedin only one
transactionalpair, that is, buyer 1 is interested only in the asset of seller 1. He places no
value onany other asset. Thisassumption simplifies the discussion byeliminating all
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at zero, the number of new exchanges created would just equal the Perlc
numberof old exchanges disrupted, irrespective of the global success litj
rate. Only if the initial number of marginally unsuccessful transactional ne
pairs exceeds the number of marginally successful pairs will increases
in g3 raise the number of successes. Formally, denoting by f(z) the
density of z, this means f'(z) <0. r
Because the number of asset exchanges in the economy is quite small
relative to the potential number of transactions, Golbe and White prob-
ably also are correct that the density of z is downward sloping at the The
margin. As a result, greater differences in opinion would increase the evei
number of successful deals. But this need not be so. Locally, the num- yeai
ber of marginally successful pairs may exceed the number of marginally IS m
unsuccessful ones. for
This formal model also suggests that the relationship is nonlinear. B
Even under the standard intuition, when the other determinants of part
merger activity lead to a high number of transactions, an increase in ers
opinion divergence will lead to a smaller increase in the number of ifth
exchanges. A
Finally, the paper could be improved by recognizing the interaction the
between the stock market and physical asset markets. I earlier identified
COIl
one interaction, the fact that options prices may provide a gauge of
opinion divergence. But other, more fundamental interactions occur.
te
Acquisition of physical assets in a merger involves two elements—
purchasing the existing profit stream of the acquired firm and pur- t e
chasing the right to manage the acquired firm. A potential purchaser mci
can acquire only the first right by purchasing a block of common stock.
Thus, a more complete model would view stock purchases as a sub- at
stitute for asset acquisition and estimate a general equilibrium model
in which both are possible.
In this regard the Golbe and White paper would be improved if it
simultaneously studied the determinants of stock market activity. That °
study would examine the same set of variables and raise the same set
of questions. For example, is it true that stock market activity is pos- acti
itively correlated with stock prices? Is it true that stock market activity
ispositively correlated with divergence of opinion, say, as measured
e
by the price of straddles?
ro
In sum, I learned something from the paper. I also expect the paper ne
to provoke additional research into time-series analysis of merger ac-
the tivity. My only wish is that the additional research had been carried
out in the current paper. agg
Ii
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Comment Robert A. Taggart, Jr.
1mall
rob- There is a natural tendency to focus on the dramatic aspects of current
t the events. Thus, the highly publicized takeover battles of the past few
the years have led many observers to conclude that recent merger activity
Urn- is more hostile, on a grander scale, and of more far-reaching significance
tal for the economy than ever before.
Because of this tendency, the study by Golbe and White is an integral
rear part of any comprehensive examination of mergers. If we are to un-
S 0 derstand mergers and their impact on the economy, we need to know
e In if the current merger activity is, in fact, unusual.
•r " An immediate contribution of this paper, therefore, is its finding that
the current activity does not appear unusual when viewed in a historical
context.The absolute number of mergers during the 1980s has been
1 e large, but once allowance is made for the size of the overall economy, e 0 the current merger wave does not stand out from the previous episodes,
cur. particularly that occurring around the turn of the century. In addition,
5— the data suggest that recent mergers have not led to any significant
increase in aggregate industrial concentration for the U.S. economy.
)ck In reaching these conclusions, Golbe and White also perform a valu-
sub: able ancillary service. They provide an excellent summary of the avail-
)del able data on aggregate merger activity in the U.S. economy since 1895.
Inparticular, they carefully review various noncomparabilities and gaps
in the data. This discussion should prove very useful to future students
of long-run merger patterns.
set Despite the problems with the data, the conclusion that current merger
activityis less impressive in relative than in absolute terms seems well
vit founded. That in turn leads to curiosity about the factors that determine
the aggregate volume of mergers and how these factors are related to
broad economic trends. It is to this issue that Golbe and White turn
er next.
Unfortunately, this effort is hampered by the fact that most available
ned theory pertains to mergers as a micro phenomenon, whereas it is the
aggregate level of mergers the authors seek to explain. What is needed
is a theory of mergers at the macro level.
In the absence of such a theory Golbe and White have assembled a
number of explanatory variables, which I will place in several categories.
for Robert A. Taggart, Jr., is professor of finance at the School of Management, Boston
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Certain macro-level variables, for example, can be guessed at relatively Overs,
easily, even without an explicit theory. We would expect, for instance, form,
that the volume of mergers is positively related to the overall level of valuat
economic activity. flOmic
The available micro-level theory does suggest certain other variables
that should be related to the aggregate merger level. That theory implies ship b
simply that mergers take place when they are perceived to have positive I
net present values. Since those values are in turn a function of cash merge
flows and discount rates, some measure of the cost of capital imme- than t
diately arises as a potential explanatory variable. convil
Certain other variables are clearly implied by the theory, but they and
are very difficult to measure at the aggregate level. Changes in the tax The
code, for example, should significantly affect the perceived values of that
mergers. But tax considerations differ enough from one merger to the seekir
next that it is hard to recommend much except dummy variables to appro
capture the aggregate effects of these tax changes. In a similar vein, it very
seems clear that periods in which market participants have sharp dif- diffici.
ferences in expectations or in which industries are in a state of upheaval POIfltt
should be ripe for mergers, but exactly how such periods should be clear
identified is far less clear. Ifl t
Tobin's q falls into still another explanatory variable category, and not fl
it is here, I believe, that the problem of applying a micro theory at the
1
macrolevel emerges most sharply. At the micro level it makes perfect
sense that low values of q should stimulate merger activity. If a firm activi
wishes to acquire a specific set of assets, and if several target firms of th
possess those assets then, other things being equal, it will choose the nse I
target with the lowest q. Moreover, the low values of q should make holdi
mergers more attractive relative to the alternative of buying the same IS thc
set of assets in the market for real capital. And indeed, q has exactly airlin
this predicted effect in cross-sectional regression studies by Hasbrouck some
(1985) and Bartley and Boardman (1986). mg o
At the macro level, however, I am not sure what an aggregate mea- analy
sure of q implies for the aggregate level of mergers. Golbe and White
argue that unusually low values of q are likely to be associated with Refei
larger numbers of undervalued firms and hence more attractive merger
candidates. That proposition strikes me as quite plausible as long as
the aggregate q primarily reflects these potential targets. Suppose, how-
ever that unusually high values of q reflect greater numbers of over- Hash
valued firms. For an acquiring firm this type of valuation error might Bai
actuallyencourage mergers, particularly if acquired firms' shareholders Roll,
are willing to accept shares of the acquiring firm's stock. Bus
Anotherpossibility is that valuation errors are made primarily by
acquiring firms' executives rather than by investors in the securities
markets. Under Roll's (1986) "hubris hypothesis" of corporate take-
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overs, for instance, capital markets are presumed efficient in the strong
e form,and hence acquisition bids at premium prices simply reflect over-
ice, valuations on the part of the bidders. Moreover, if the buoyant eco-
0 nomicclimate associated with high values of q is also conducive to
bi greater bidder hubris, Golbe and White's finding of a positive relation-
es ship between q and merger activity may not seem so anomalous.
I do not claim that either of the possible linkages between q and
ash merger activity that I have described above is inherently more plausible
me- than the one described by Golbe and White. Nonetheless, I am not
convinced they are less plausible, either, and so I do not find Golbe
hey and White's empirical results necessarily puzzling.
tax The general difficulty that these remarks are intended to illustrate is
s of that the available theory simply does not give us much guidance in
the seeking out the determinants of aggregate merger activity. The most
s to appropriate variables and the expected direction to their effects are not
it very sharply delineated. When this problem is combined with some
dif- difficult measurement problems, we should perhaps not be too disap-
aval pointed that we do not come away from a study of this type with a
I be clear vision of the driving forces behind merger activity.
In the final analysis it may turn out that the volume of mergers does
•and not reflect macroeconomic factors as much as it does industry or sec-
the toral factors. Popular generalizations tend to associate the various merger
fect "waves" with particular industry groups. Thus, the spurt in merger
activity at the turn of the century is thought to reflect the consolidation
rms of the steel, oil, and other mining and manufacturing industries; the
the rise in mergers in the 1920s is commonly linked to the public utility
ake holding company movement; and the most recent increase in mergers
ime is thought to reflect the restructuring of such diverse industries as oil,
ctly airlines, broadcasting, and food and consumer products. If there is
uck some truth to these generalizations, it may be that further understand-
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